

*Secretary Albright*

# U.S. Commitment To Security And Prosperity in Asia

July 27, 1998

*Intervention at the ASEAN Regional Forum Plenary,  
Manila, Philippines.*

Fellow ministers, distinguished colleagues: I am honored to represent the United States at this meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Let me thank Foreign Secretary Siazon and the Government of the Philippines for all they have done to keep this forum and ASEAN resilient and strong through the trials of the past year, and to make our conference a success.

For the past few years, we have been meeting to celebrate the success of a region that has been gradually coming together around principles of freedom, open markets, law, and a commitment to peace. This year, we are meeting at a time characterized more by doubt than by triumph.

There is nothing I can say to dispel the doubts so many people in this region have about the future. After all, we cannot wish the economic crisis away. We have to face it squarely, take the difficult actions we all know are necessary, and admit what the evidence of the last year so clearly shows—that there are no easy answers.

But there is one thing that I ask you never to doubt: that is the commitment of the United States to the security and well being of our friends in Asia and our desire to see that the only dominant forces in this region remain freedom and prosperity.

Our commitment begins with our treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand—and with our forward-deployed military presence in this region. It is reflected in our strategic engagement with China and Russia. It is manifested in our financial support to the IMF and World Bank to help Asian economies recover—and in the direct assistance we have provided to the people of this region. It is embodied as well in our desire for a deeper, more substantive partnership with ASEAN across the range of our common interests. In all these ways, we are in this together. This is true in part because the United States has a vital security interest in speeding Asia's recovery.

We have 37,000 troops in Korea standing guard at one of the most dangerous frontiers in the world; any threat to Korea's economic stability would be a threat to the stability of the Korean Peninsula as a whole. Thailand is also among our closest and most important allies. We have long relied on Indonesia to be a force for stability in Southeast Asia and for moderation in world affairs.

We do not wish to see misery give rise to mistrust among any of our friends in this region, or to see poverty push more desperate people across their borders, or to see economic despair lead to disillusionment with economic and political freedom.

We have a strategic interest as well in ASEAN's continued success, and we know that this depends in part on how well its members cooperate to overcome the current crisis. In fact, we want to see ASEAN strengthen its cohesion and capacity to solve real world problems, and we want to build on the achievements of the ARF, too. Clearly, effective regional institutions are needed in this region today more than ever before.

The ARF has had a productive year. We have had intersessional discussions on disaster relief and confidence building, a conference on preventive diplomacy, and a meeting of heads of defense institutions. We are building habits of cooperation and consultation that will make conflict in this region increasingly less likely.

And the sphere of security we are building is growing. The United States strongly supports Mongolia's membership in the ARF; we hope that proud and democratic nation will soon take its rightful place among us.

In the coming year, the ARF should continue to develop along the evolutionary path we laid out in 1995: from confidence building to preventive diplomacy to an active role in resolving conflicts. We should take the next steps in this process by exploring the overlap between confidence building and

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preventive diplomacy. While the confidence-building foundations must be solid, the ARF must also move forward if it is to remain vital and relevant. This is important in part because the traditional security challenges the ARF was created to address must still be met—above all, the challenge of stopping the spread of dangerous weapons and technologies.

As nations that work together to build security and confidence in Asia, we agree that this region was getting safer until India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. While both nations have legitimate security concerns,

neither faced an imminent threat that could justify the far greater danger we all now face.

Our goal is not to point fingers but to point the way to stability, security, and peace. We are urging India and Pakistan to accept the standards set forth in the Geneva P-5 and London G-8 Communiqués, and endorsed by the UN Security Council. We ask India and Pakistan to adhere to the CTBT without conditions. We ask that they not produce fissile material for nuclear weapons pending conclusion of a treaty to halt such production permanently. We ask that they not deploy nuclear weapons or missiles capable of carrying them. We ask that they commit to effective means of controlling exports of dangerous weapons, materials, and technologies. We ask them to resume high-level

dialogue with each other to address the full range of issues that divide them, including Kashmir. In this connection, we hope this week's meeting in Colombo between Prime Ministers Sharif and Vajpayee can get such a dialogue on track.

Our purpose is not to isolate either country. On the contrary: We have been trying to deepen our partnership with them in recent years. That effort can continue if they do what virtually every nation in the world is now asking them to do; if they do what is in any case profoundly in their self interest.

The United States also appreciates the support of the ARF for efforts to achieve a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. That effort depends on continued implementation of the U.S.-D.P.R.K. Agreed Framework, which has frozen and will eventually dismantle North Korea's nuclear program.

We need to convey a common message to the North about the importance of adhering to the Framework. The South Asian tests provide no license for the North to renege on its commitments. And there should be no doubt that we will live up to ours. Even in this time of financial hardship, those of us who can contribute to KEDO—the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization—should contribute. Our security depends on it.

The key to lasting peace in Korea remains dialogue between North and South, and the United States fully supports President Kim's efforts to restart that dialogue in parallel to the Four Party Talks. The North's actions in recent weeks have not helped the process. But they certainly do not call into question the wisdom of President Kim's approach.

In the long run, the ARF could play a role in facilitating a dialogue. By its own choosing, North Korea is not a member. But if it decides to reapply and expresses its commitment to abide by and respect fully the decisions and statements of the ARF, we will join other ARF members in giving its application full consideration. In Korea and in South Asia, we are faced with the challenge of maintaining regional stability by avoiding violence between nations—a challenge we all acknowledge requires a high degree of international cooperation.

But an important lesson of the last year is that stability depends on much more than the absence of conflict between nations. It also depends on fostering conditions within nations that allow societies to prosper and hold together. It requires maintaining peace between people and their leaders. It requires cooperation among nations to solve problems that threaten to spill across borders.

Many of the challenges we face today will require us to talk about matters that are usually seen as the domestic affairs of other nations. I know there is a great deal of sensitivity about this. And I understand that. Americans are certainly sensitive when we perceive that others are interfering in our own affairs.

The question we must ask is what we mean by interference, especially in an age of interdependence. Think of it. The prosperity of Americans today is affected today by the economic policies of the Government of Japan. The health of the Japanese people is affected by environmental policies pursued by China. The stability of the Chinese economy is affected by the solvency of the banking system in Thailand. The well-being of the Thai people is affected by the flow of drugs and refugees from Burma and by haze carried on winds from Indonesia.

When one country imposes its will on another, that is intervention. But when ASEAN and its partners work to help a nation overcome civil war and build democracy, as we have been striving to do in Cambodia, we are not imposing; we are helping others realize their aspirations.

When we give assistance and candid advice to a neighbor experiencing an environmental crisis, as we have to Indonesia, we are not intervening in an internal matter but dealing with a regional threat.

When we urge a government to engage in dialogue with a legitimate political movement, as we are doing in the case of Burma, that is not interference; that is standing up for the expressed will of that country's people.

One thing is clear: If a nation is important to our security and facing problems that could threaten our security, then we must deal with those problems frankly here.

One nation undergoing a process of change in which we have all expressed an interest is Indonesia. As my friend Foreign Minister Alatas knows well, the reason for our concern is straightforward. We value Indonesia's contributions to the stability and prosperity of this region. Had Indonesia not been both a leader and a good neighbor in this region, I do not think there would be an ASEAN or an ARF today. I do not think there would be peace in Cambodia. I do not think we would have an APEC commitment to open and free trade in Asia and the Pacific. We want Indonesia to emerge from its current difficulties as strong and prosperous as it has ever been—and with the commitment to democracy that it needs to stay strong and prosperous in the years to come.

Our most urgent concern now is to help the Indonesian economy recover and to help see that the urgent humanitarian needs of the Indonesian people are met. That is why the United States strongly supports the additional IMF assistance to Indonesia that was announced earlier this month. It is why we have pledged over \$100 million in food and medical supplies for Indonesia, in addition to continuing assistance programs worth \$550 million. It is why a week ago, my government purchased \$250 million in wheat, much of which we will donate to the Indonesian people. It is why we will support debt rescheduling, as well as additional lending from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

We recognize that this may not yet be enough; that the Indonesian people are still hurting; that the three decades of progress they have made in nutrition, sanitation, and health

are still under threat. We will try to do more and urge our partners around the world to do more, too.

At the same time, Indonesia's recovery will depend far more on what Indonesians themselves do in the coming months and years. Continued economic reform is essential. Just as essential is the effort by Indonesia's new leaders to win the confidence of their people by holding elections, respecting a free press, encouraging ethnic tolerance, resolving the dispute over East Timor, and building a transparent, accountable civilian-led government.

America has no interest in supporting any particular parties or personalities in Indonesia. We do have an interest, shared by the Indonesian people, in the development of a stable, prosperous, democracy there.

That is also our interest in Cambodia. Cambodia faces tremendous problems, but it would be self-defeating for us to project a sense of hopelessness about its future. As we have seen again in the last 24 hours, its people desperately want to make democracy work. While their leaders have undoubtedly tried to intimidate them, the question remains whether on election day Cambodians were able to vote their conscience.

At the same time, it is equally important that we not rush to judgment about the outcome of this election, for we have seen the democratic process in Cambodia unravel before. And the real test of Cambodia's democracy will come after the ballots are counted.

We have all invested a great deal in Cambodia, and we all long for the day when that country can be confident of a democratic future. Sadly, that day has not come yet.

The purpose of the election was not to make it easier for us to declare success and walk away. It was to give the Cambodian people a chance to start anew a democratic process that was arrested when the coalition government disintegrated amidst violence last year.

That process must continue until the day comes when Cambodians can participate in the political life of their country without fear, until they are confident the rule of law will endure, until they have a government that uses power to uplift their country, instead of abusing it on behalf of a privileged few. Until that day, we

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must keep the pressure on and stay engaged. I trust that the Friends of Cambodia and the ASEAN troika will be willing to carry on their work—as it is needed. I trust we will all continue to pursue accountability for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge. And while we cannot impose democracy in Cambodia, we should continue to encourage it by making our assistance to any government conditional on respect for international norms.

With both Cambodia and Indonesia making at least some political progress against what are clearly great odds, I find it especially sad that we must still address the lack of movement toward reconciliation in Burma. Burma is a country in great and growing distress today. The situation there has gotten worse in the last year; the threat it poses to the stability of this region has grown.

Arrests aimed at decimating the opposition continue. Members of legal political parties are being prevented from traveling in their own country. The Burmese economy is falling apart. A whole generation of young people is being lost as universities, and now even high schools stay closed for fear of unrest.

Burma is also becoming the epicenter of the regional AIDS crisis; the epidemic there is out of control and growing faster than anywhere in Southeast Asia. The government's response has been denial, with the result that there has been virtually no public education. The virus is now spreading to India and to China, where 80% of reported HIV infections are found along the Burmese border.

The flow of heroin and amphetamines from Burma also continues unabated. Criminals who traffic in drugs are still being treated like honored citizens, while citizens who speak out for a more lawful society are still being treated like criminals.

Increasingly, the leadership speaks of a return to self-isolation. But self-isolation is self-deception; it is an illusion. There is no way to isolate the Burmese people from the need to participate in the affairs of the world—and no way to isolate the region from the problems Burma is exporting.

With each passing day the likelihood of a social breakdown—or explosion—that would undermine regional stability grows higher; the likelihood that a future government will be able to tackle Burma's problems becomes smaller. This is a moment of truth and of urgency for Burma and for all of us concerned about its fate.

Last month, Burma's National League for Democracy—NLD—asked the government to convene the parliament the Burmese people elected in 1990. The United States supports the NLD call. It urges no more than what is

required by the UN General Assembly resolutions so many of us have long supported. It reflects the extraordinary patience of the opposition, which has waited 8 years just to see the results of the last election recognized.

Dialogue is the only way to resolve this. To that end, the NLD is flexible. The UN is willing to play a role, which we should all support. As for the government, it has already recognized its interest in talking to armed insurgents. I hope it will also see its interest in talking to a nonviolent movement backed by Burma's people.

Burma's leaders must decide: Are they concerned solely with holding on to power, no matter what the cost to their people and the region, or are they willing to open the door to nonviolent change? If they choose the latter course, the international community will respond in a spirit of genuine partnership. And we will accept any outcome that is acceptable to the Burmese people.

I welcome my colleagues' comments about how we can work together on this issue and all the issues I have mentioned. As President Estrada urged last week: "Let us be open to one another and freely and candidly exchange views no matter how controversial the issue." For silence does not make problems go away; it merely makes them fester and spread until no one can afford to ignore them.

There are many legitimate ways to approach issues such as human rights, corruption, environmental protection, and the fight against drugs. But I can think of no legitimate reason why we should not address them together, for they are the issues as far as our people are concerned.

There is no question that this region will recover from the economic difficulties that are consuming our attention today. The real question is whether it will emerge stronger, more open, more democratic, better equipped to meet new challenges. Our friends in the region have an opportunity to build a better Southeast Asia. America hopes they will seize it, and we are ready to help.

We share the same goals for this region and for the world. We created this forum because we believe that we can advance our goals by talking and working together. Thanks to the ARF, the cause of peace and security in Southeast Asia is now the concern of every nation represented at this table.

I can assure you that the United States will do all it can to help make this process of regional cooperation work, to build on the principles we have already established, and on the record of success we have already forged. ■

*Secretary Albright*

# U.S.-Asia Relations and Supporting Effective Global Leadership

July 24, 1998

*Address to the International Diplomacy Council, San Francisco, California [introductory remarks deleted].*

Thank you very much Mr. Mayor, Ambassador Rosenthal, Charlotte Shultz, members of the diplomatic community, distinguished guests, and friends. I am delighted to be back here in San Francisco. And I want to thank all of you for coming, especially those who passed up the opportunity to bond in Bohemia Grove.

Mr. Mayor, I am particularly grateful for your introduction and for your attendance here this afternoon. You are the world's hardest act to follow, but I appreciate your presence. It reflects the fact that San Francisco is a place with global interests and global clout—and where the connections between American foreign policy and the day to day lives of our people are fully evident.

Ambassador Rosenthal, I am delighted, but not surprised, to see a career Foreign Service officer continuing after retirement to serve his community and country. The International Diplomacy Council—IDC—is a superb example of citizen diplomacy, and, in our era, people-to-people contacts are the ties that truly bind the international system together. I congratulate the IDC for its work, and thank you very much for sponsoring this event.

As many of you know, I am en route to Asia for meetings early next week with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—or ASEAN. I will also visit our key democratic partners—Australia and New Zealand—and Papua New Guinea, which has been devastated by a terrible and tragic act of nature.

This afternoon, I plan to focus my remarks on the U.S. approach to Asia and also on the need for adequate resources to conduct our foreign policy around the globe.

When the Cold War ended, some Asian leaders feared that America would retreat from its historic presence in their part of the world. Instead, our engagement—both governmental and non-governmental—has steadily increased. By now, there should be no doubt: America is and will remain a leader in the Asia-Pacific. In

the 17 months I have served as Secretary of State, this will be my sixth trip to Asia, my third time this year.

Our role there is vital, from the stabilizing effects of our diplomatic and military presence, to the galvanizing impact of our commercial ties, to the transforming influence of our ideals. And our commitment is solid, because it is solidly based on American interests.

We have a broad strategic interest in a region where we have fought three wars in the last half century and where almost any outbreak of international violence would threaten our well-being and that of our friends. We have a deep security interest in a region whose cooperation we must have to respond to the global threats of proliferation, terrorism, illegal narcotics, and the degradation of our environment. We have an abiding political interest in supporting democracy and human rights in a region where the majority of the world's population lives. And we have a compelling economic interest in a region that is home to so many of our partners in trade.

That is especially true here in the Golden State, our nation's export leader. Half of California's exports go to customers in Asia. That translates into thousands of jobs in sectors such as the aeronautics and computer industries, agriculture, and financial services. And nationally, exports account for nearly one-third of the remarkable economic growth we have enjoyed these past 5 years.

These American interests in Asia cannot be separated into discrete boxes. They reinforce each other. Accordingly, we are working with our allies and others in the region to build an Asia-Pacific community based on a full range of interests, including economic growth, the rule of law, and a common commitment to peace.

We are proceeding bilaterally, by fortifying our core alliances and relationships, and through multilateral institutions such as the

ASEAN Regional Forum and the International Monetary Fund. Let me provide some examples.

Five decades ago, our predecessors made a strategic decision to help Japan rebuild from the destruction of World War II. Today, our alliance with Japan is the irreplaceable cornerstone of Asian security and a major contributor to stability and progress around the globe.

Over the past year, we have completed and signed new defense guidelines with Tokyo to ensure more effective cooperation among our armed forces. And politically, we coordinate on issues ranging from the building of peace in

Bosnia to safeguarding the environment to battling AIDS.

Today, our partnership is as deep and wide-ranging as any bilateral relationship on earth. And we expect it will continue to flourish over the remaining months of this century and throughout the next.

I look forward to seeing Foreign Minister Obuchi, with whom I have worked closely. We will be seeing each other in Manila, and I look forward to congratulating him for being selected as his party's choice to be prime minister. We are confident that on vital matters of diplomatic and security cooperation, there will be continuity in the policies of both countries.

A second key ally in East Asia is the Republic of Korea. Here, our relationship has drawn new vigor from the election as President of Kim

Dae-jung, a long-time champion of democracy.

Last month, during a visit by President Kim to Washington, President Clinton reaffirmed our alliance with Seoul and our friendship with the Korean people. This relationship is a core element in our Asian security strategy, including the goal of peace on the Korean Peninsula, where 37,000 American armed forces are still deployed.

Another of our important bilateral relationships in Asia is with the People's Republic of China. We Americans want stability and peace. We want to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. We want a healthy, growing world economy with open markets and fair rules of trade. We want help in responding to global threats. And we want to increase respect for human rights and democracy.

Events in China will do much to determine whether we make progress toward these goals. Our task is to encourage China to define its own interests in ways that are compatible with ours. Our approach is to engage in a dialogue with Chinese leaders, while encouraging a broad exchange of information and ideas between our peoples. The President's trip to Beijing was a dramatic step forward in that effort.

The question is whether our approach is working. The evidence suggests that it is. For example, during the past few years, we have seen China move from being part of the nuclear proliferation problem to becoming a part of the solution. It has joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, become party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, promised not to assist any unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, cut off nuclear cooperation with Iran as well as missile cooperation, and supported peace talks in Korea.

During the June summit, Presidents Clinton and Jiang agreed further that our nations would not target each other with nuclear missiles. The Chinese agreed to actively study membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime. And China said that in the future it would not sell missiles to Iran or Pakistan.

On human rights, China has released several prominent dissidents, ratified one international human rights convention and promised to sign another this fall, placed new emphasis on the rule of law, permitted more open, public discussion of political reform, and agreed to participate in and cosponsor an NGO forum on human rights. China has also continued to implement economic reforms and increased its cooperation with us on everything from maritime practices to drug law enforcement to science and technology.

Despite this, critics say that this is not good enough. They argue that China needs to do more and change more. They are right. And that is precisely the message the President brought to Beijing.

The President spent much of his time during the summit working the hard issues, urging China to strengthen its control over technology exports, pressing for the release of additional political prisoners, calling for renewed dialogue with the Dalai Lama and for respect for Tibet's unique cultural and linguistic heritage, standing up for religious freedom, pushing China to further open its markets, and stressing that improved relations between Washington and Beijing cannot come at the expense of Taiwan.

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As I have said many times, engagement is not the same as endorsement. We continue to have sharp differences with China, but we also believe that the best way to narrow those differences is by raising them vigorously and discussing them honestly—as President Clinton did not only in private but openly before the Chinese people and the world.

It would be naive to suggest that our engagement alone will cause democracy in China to blossom. China's future will be determined by the Chinese, not by an outside power. But our engagement is helping the people of that country to have more access to information, to have more exposure to democratic practices, and to face less resistance from their government to new ideas.

In contrast, cutting off U.S. engagement, as some still advocate, would do nothing to strengthen the forces of change. It would not eliminate a single danger, free a single dissident, or inform a single Chinese citizen about the ways and means of democracy. It might provide a moment of instant gratification to some, but it would not advance either our interests or our principles.

That is why I am gratified that on Wednesday the House voted, by an even larger majority than last year, to renew normal trade relations with China. America's approach to Asia rests on building strong bilateral relations with Japan, Korea, China, and other key countries. But it relies, as well, on the multilateral cooperation we have forged with regional leaders.

For example, this weekend in Manila, I will be meeting under the auspices of ASEAN with counterparts from throughout the Asia-Pacific. At the top of our agenda will be the regional financial crisis, which is both an urgent economic concern and a cause of widespread hardship in East Asia.

The crisis resulted from bad economic habits in the countries involved and on the part of those who did business with them. A lack of transparency and effective oversight meant that problems caused by ill-conceived investments and bad loans were not caught in time. Beginning last summer, markets responded, and a crisis of confidence grew.

At the meetings in Manila, we will stress the lessons of the past year. To attract outside investment and to ignite new growth, it is vital to apply democratic principles and the rule of law to the marketplace. Competition must be encouraged. Fair conditions for direct investment must be created and maintained. Accountability must be emphasized, and corruption must be stopped.

In some countries, the medicine of economic reform is bitter. It requires that the old ways of doing business must change, inefficient firms close, and cozy relationships break up. The consequences for workers and families caught in the middle can be difficult and unfair.

But this does not change the fact that reform is medicine. If refused, the illness only grows worse. If taken, recovery becomes only a matter of time. Further, an economy powered by open and sound financial policies will be better able to adjust to the global market than an economy that is closed and hobbled by financial favoritism.

United States policy toward the financial crisis is clear. We strongly urge reform, but we will also do all we can to help the countries that are being hurt by the crisis and that are committed to reform.

We take this approach because Asia includes not only some of our closest allies and friends but also some of the best customers for U.S. products and services. More than one-third of our nation's exports go there. Thousands of good jobs in San Francisco and Los Angeles, Miami, and Seattle, depend on economic vigor in places such as Bangkok and Seoul.

Unfortunately, the crisis has already caused a slowdown in our exports to the region and an increase in our trade deficit. Increasingly, its effects are being seen in economies and markets worldwide. The risk of long-term harm to the global economy, and to our own prosperity, cannot be ignored.

A key lesson of the past year is one Kim Dae-jung has been teaching for decades: Democracies are better able to adjust to crises than regimes that are autocratic. Accordingly, the prospects for strengthening democratic institutions will be a topic of even greater than usual interest to the United States during our meetings with the nations of ASEAN.

We will be encouraging the new leaders in Indonesia to reach beyond the traditional centers of power to devise a plan for peaceful, but profound, economic and political reform based on democratic principles. We will be expressing concern about the ongoing threat to international stability and peace posed by the repression of political freedom and the tolerance of rampant drug trafficking in Burma. We

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will reiterate our support for a dialogue in that country between the authorities and the democratic opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi. And we will be seeking a unified international response to the unfolding developments in Cambodia.

As the recent death of Pol Pot reminds us, the Cambodian people paid an enormous price for past divisions and violence. Earlier in this decade, a UN peacekeeping operation helped end that nation's civil war and permit elections in which the overwhelming majority of voters participated. However, the resulting coalition government was weak and ultimately fell apart

as a result of brutal acts of violence.

This weekend, Cambodia will try again. The election campaign that will culminate on Sunday has been marred by incidents of violence, intimidation, and manipulation by the government-controlled press. Hopes now for the election's legitimacy hinge on whether the polling proceeds fairly, the rights of voters are protected, and the ballots are counted accurately.

Whatever the outcome, the responsibilities of the next government will be the same: to use, not abuse power; to create a climate in which genuine political debate is possible; to replace cronyism and corruption with accountability; and to respect civil

liberties, including freedom of the press.

The international community cannot impose democracy in Cambodia, but we can encourage it by making our assistance to any government conditional on respect for international norms. We can continue to support non-governmental initiatives to strengthen civil society. We can be consistent in dealing with Cambodian leaders in accordance not with what they promise, but in accordance with what they do. And we can be both persistent in pushing for democratic reform and patient in understanding that the divisions within Cambodia remain deep and will take time to overcome.

Before closing, I want to raise a broader subject that is relevant not only to the Asia-Pacific, but to American influence around the world. For today, on every continent, people look to America for leadership. That serves our

interests, which are global. It benefits our people, who want a future that is secure, prosperous, and free. And it reflects American character and ideals.

But to be effective, leadership must be backed by resources; by the people, expertise, equipment, and money required to get the job done. And, unfortunately, today, our foreign policy lacks disposable income.

Currently, we allocate only about <sup>1</sup>/<sub>15</sub> of the portion of our wealth that we did in the post-World War II era to support democracy and growth overseas. Among the industrialized countries, we are dead last in such contributions relative to the size of our economy. We are the number one debtor to the United Nations and the multilateral development banks.

For the past decade, we have been cutting foreign policy positions, closing diplomatic posts, and shutting USAID missions. Under the current budget agreement, we face a reduction in buying power of 16% over the next 5 years. And committees in the House and Senate have just voted crippling cuts in the President's request to fund international programs during the coming year.

These facts have consequence. Today, there is a growing gap between what the American people want to accomplish abroad and what we are able to accomplish. There is growing resistance to our requests that others meet their obligations when we have not met ours. There is a growing risk that extremists will exploit openings for mischief that a more active American presence could have prevented. There is a growing possibility that historic opportunities to ensure the future security, prosperity, and freedom of our people will be lost.

For example, we face deep cuts in programs to strengthen democracy's hold in Russia and the other New Independent States. Our request for funds to promote the rule of law in China is being denied. We may not receive full funding to help monitor and detect possible nuclear tests abroad. Our ability to support international peacekeeping, promote women's rights, bolster free enterprise, encourage the use of environmentally friendly technologies, and carry out other worthy initiatives is being nicked and dined to death.

Furthermore, Congress has not yet approved urgently needed payments to the International Monetary Fund. The IMF is neither infallible nor perfect, but it is the single most important and effective instrument we have for dousing the fires of financial crisis in Asia and elsewhere.

Because the IMF functions as a sort of international credit union, in more than 50 years, its programs have not cost our taxpayers one penny. The time has come for the House of Representatives to follow the Senate's lead: to protect American prosperity and renew American leadership by providing our share of funding to the IMF.

The same is true for the United Nations. There is no better place to speak plainly about this than here in San Francisco, where the UN was born.

It is no secret that there are some in Congress and our country who believe the UN is a sinister organization. They suspect it operates a fleet of black helicopters, which may, at any moment, swoop down into our backyards and steal our lawn furniture. They say it is bent on world domination, which is absurd—and that we cannot trust it because it is full of foreigners, which really can't be helped.

The truth is that the UN is not an alien presence on U.S. soil. It has "Made in America" written all over it—invented by people with names such as Truman and Acheson and Eleanor Roosevelt. Our predecessors brought it together, helped write its Charter, and approved its rules. Today, it is addressing challenges from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction to the care of refugees to the prosecution of war criminals—none of which we could deal with as effectively on our own.

Last year, we developed with Congress a plan to encourage UN reform while paying the nearly \$1 billion we owe. Now is the time to update that plan. Now is the time, at long last, to pay our UN bills.

In our era, foreign policy is not really foreign anymore. The funds we devote to building democracy, halting the spread of nuclear weapons, fostering economic development, fighting disease, preventing conflict, and battling crime have their dividends right back

here in America. We see the payoff in more and better jobs, less dangerous neighborhoods, greater hope for the global environment, and sons and daughters who do not have to go off to war.

Surveys indicate that most Americans believe that 20% or more of the federal budget is devoted to overseas programs. In reality, it's roughly 1%. But that 1% may be accountable for 50% of the history that is written about our era, and it will affect the lives of 100% of the American people.

A U.S. President from this State said once that there is no advancement for Americans at home in a retreat from the problems of the world. America has a vital national interest in world stability, and no other nation can uphold that interest for us.

I did not agree with everything Richard Nixon said, but I think we can all see eye to eye with him on that. Whether we are contemplating the future of Asia, the coming together of Europe, the hopes of Africa, the perils of the Gulf, or the fulfillment of the democratic promise here in our own hemisphere, the essential truth is the same.

We Americans have a big advantage because we know who we are and what we believe. We have a purpose. And like the farmer's faith that seeds and rain will cause crops to grow, it is our faith that if we are true to our principles; we will succeed.

Let us, then, do honor to that faith. In this new era of possibility, let us reject the temptation of complacency and assume, not with complaint, but welcome, the leader's role established by our forebears.

And by living up to the heritage of our past, let us together fulfill the promise of our future—so that we may enter the new century free and respected, prosperous, and at peace. Thank you all very much. ■

*Secretary Albright*

# Advancing the Status of Women In the 21st Century

July 11, 1998

*Remarks upon induction into the National Women's Hall of Fame, Seneca Falls, New York.*

Thank you all very, very much. Thank you, Karen Stone, for those very kind words, and thank you all for your very warm welcome.

Sister inductees and the families and representatives: Congratulations. Mayor Jones, Lyn Bedell, organizers of Honors Weekend, guests, and friends: Like many public officials, I am often compared to illustrious predecessors. So you can imagine how happy I am to be the first American Secretary of State to join the Women's Hall of Fame. I am tempted to call up Henry Kissinger just to say, "Henry, eat your heart out."

As a little girl, I had many dreams, but I never imagined something like this. When I look at the list of members of this Hall of Fame, I am inspired by the incredible range and richness of their accomplishments. As someone who cannot sing like Ella Fitzgerald, write like Emily Dickinson, act like Helen Hayes, or shoot like Annie Oakley, I am astonished and humbled to be in their company and to be in the company of the awesome women you honor today.

As I contemplate the world at the end of the 20th century, I draw encouragement especially from the memory of women who dared to stand up and fight for human dignity and freedom.

Simply being in Seneca Falls is a reminder of the debt we owe. So much of what we've accomplished as individuals and as a nation is attributable to the courage, vision, and brilliance of our foremothers. After all, who but the crafters of the Seneca Falls Declaration could have found a way, in just their second sentence, to get the better of Thomas Jefferson?

Because they asserted that men and women are created equal, Lucretia Mott, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucy Stone, and their compatriots were scorned, ridiculed, laughed at, and vilified. Day after day, they were advised to abandon their foolish quest for suffrage. For decades, they experienced more setbacks than steps forward. But like the movement to abolish

slavery, the campaign for women's rights exposed a fundamental contradiction between American ideals and reality, between the promise of liberty for all and the denial of real freedom to millions of people.

Once that contradiction was exposed, and every stratagem for rationalizing it had been tried and found wanting, it had to be confronted; it had to be eliminated. And, ultimately, the appeal made by the signers of the Seneca Falls Declaration to "the divinely implanted principles of human nature," as they put it, could not be denied.

Today, we look back across the years of inspiration and instruction. But we also look ahead, for the movement launched here is still young; still blossoming; still spreading the good news of equality and empowerment, justice and freedom. It is now far more than an American movement; it is universal—it has gone global. And I believe that of all the forces that will shape the world of the 21st century, this may be the most important. From the tiniest village to the largest city, surmounting every barrier of geography, language, ethnicity, and background, the movement to unleash the full capacities and energies of women and girls is gaining strength.

In recent years, I have had the privilege of seeing in virtually every region of every continent the continuous working out, in ways unimaginable at the time, of the principles long ago formulated here in Seneca Falls. In Bosnia, I have seen women's groups insisting on a voice in the affairs of their country, so that they may recreate a culture of tolerance and heal the wounds of past strife. In central Europe and the New Independent States, I have seen the birth of movements designed to give women a partnership role in the construction of new democracies. In Central Africa, I have seen women from different ethnic groups working side by side to prevent the return of genocidal violence to their lands. In Latin America, I have seen women coming together to achieve

economic opportunity and legal equity in societies where habits of machismo have been deeply entrenched. In China, where females are all too often not accorded the value they deserve, the First Lady and I saw women, just two weeks ago, helping each other to find a place in the new world economy through education, training, and microenterprise. Around the world, I have seen women of virtually every national, religious, and cultural affiliation joined in support of more open political systems.

Of course, this does not mean that women everywhere want to be the same. The desire for self-expression is universal, but different women do not express themselves in the same way. Certainly, not every woman looks to the Western model for emulation. It is worth noting, for example, that in the West a woman's right to own property is a fairly recent development. Under Islamic law, women have always had that right. And although women have made great political progress here in the United States, unlike the largest Hindu nation and three of the most populous Islamic countries, we have not yet had a female head of government.

So when we talk about advancing the status of women, we're not trying to force our particular way of doing things or our particular values upon other people. We're trying instead to make progress toward consensus goals that have been articulated and agreed upon by women everywhere. These include the great wellspring of respect for human dignity passed on to us by those who convened in Seneca Falls. They include the currents of equality and justice that gathered strength in Beijing. And they are why efforts to advance the status of women can never again be confined to the backwaters or side channels.

They must be—and I am proud to say—they have become a part of the mainstream of the foreign policy of the United States. Helping women to move ahead is the right thing to do for America; it is also the smart thing. For as we approach the new century, we know that despite the great strides made in recent decades, women remain an undervalued and underdeveloped human resource. This is not to say that women have trouble finding work. In many societies, in addition to bearing and nurturing the children, women do most of the non-child related work. But often, women are barred from owning land and permitted little if any say in government, while girls are often excluded from schools and provided less nourishment than boys.

It is no accident that, today, most of the world's poor are women. Frequently, they are left to care for children without the help of the

children's father. Many are entangled at a young age in a web of ignorance, discrimination, exploitation, and abuse.

In our diplomacy, we are working with others to change that, because we know from experience that when women have the knowledge and power to make our own choices, societies are better able to break the chains of poverty, birth rates stabilize, environmental awareness increases, the spread of AIDS and other sexually transmitted disease slows, and socially constructive values are more likely to be passed on to the young. This is how human progress is generated. This is how peaceful and democratic societies evolve. This is how lasting prosperity is built.

To these ends, our overseas aid programs include many projects that expand the ability of women to succeed economically through legal reform and access to education, credit, and health care. This is vital because economists will tell you that especially in the developing world, income controlled by the mother is many times more likely to be used to promote the health and education of children than income controlled by the father.

We also support international family planning programs, because we believe that women have a right to control their own bodies and because we want to reduce the number of abortions. And we want to make it more likely that when children are born, they survive and thrive.

We are working to equip women in emerging democracies with skills and knowledge they need to participate politically, whether as officials, advocates, or simply as citizens exercising what Susan B. Anthony called "the right protective of all other rights,"—the right to vote.

From Central Asia to Central America, we have a vital interest in the spread and deepening of democracy. But as the sentiments expressed here in Seneca Falls affirm, there can be no democracy if the voices of half the population are not heard.

Fifty years ago, a great American First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, was the driving force behind the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Three years ago, at the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, another great First Lady—Hillary Rodham Clinton reaffirmed—eloquently reaffirmed—America's commitment to that declaration and to its application to all people, stating specifically that there can be no distinction

*"Helping women to move ahead is the right thing to do for America; it is also the smart thing."*

drawn between human rights and women's rights, for each includes the other, and both must be observed.

Now, I don't know whether this resulted from a conversation between those two First Ladies, but I do know that the Universal Declaration embodies values that are central to all cultures, reflecting both the wondrous diversity that defines us and the common humanity that binds us.

Unfortunately, today, despite progress that has been made, in many countries appalling abuses are still being committed against women. These include coerced abortions and

sterilizations, children sold into prostitution, ritual mutilations, dowry murders, and domestic violence. There are those who suggest that all this is cultural, and there's nothing we can do about it. I say it's criminal, and we each have a responsibility to stop it.

That is why we persist in our effort to persuade key members of the Senate—and they know who they are—that it is long past time for America to become party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. That is why we back so strongly the international war crimes tribunals, because we believe that the authors of ethnic cleansing should be held accountable, and those who see rape as just another tactic of war must pay for their crimes. That is why we are speaking up on behalf of the

women and girls of Afghanistan, who have been victimized by all factions in their country's bitter civil war. The most powerful of those factions, the Taliban, seems determined to drag Afghan women back from the dawn of the 21st century to the 13th. The only female rights they appear to recognize are the rights to remain silent and invisible, uneducated and unemployed. Afghan women and girls have asked for our help. I know because last fall, I sat in a tent in the high mountains of Central Asia and listened to their stories.

I'll tell you what I told them. The United States cannot and will not abandon them. We are increasing our support for education and training. And we have made it clear that if leaders of the Taliban or any other Afghan faction want international acceptance, they must treat women not as chattel but as people—and they must respect human rights.

*"The sentiments contained in the Seneca Falls Declaration have endured not simply because of their logic and eloquence but because of the underlying power of their central premise, which is that every individual counts."*

Finally, because we believe in helping every woman to have a fair chance in life, we have undertaken a major diplomatic and law enforcement effort to halt trafficking in women and girls. After all, if we believe in zero tolerance for those who sell illegal drugs, shouldn't we feel even more strongly about those who buy and sell human beings?

This is one of the fastest-growing criminal enterprises in the world. It exploits the desperate economic needs of more than a million mostly young women every year—women who think they're applying for jobs as governesses, waitresses, or sales clerks but who end up virtual slaves of thugs, pimps, or unscrupulous employers.

Our strategy is to educate the public, assist the victims, protect the vulnerable, and apprehend the perpetrators. Our approach is to develop and implement specific plans in countries, including our own, where predators and the preyed upon are most often found.

For example, as a result of my talks with Prime Minister Netanyahu, Israel has set up special police units in Tel Aviv and Haifa. We have established a joint working group with Italy. And in response to a request from the Government of Ukraine, we are preparing a comprehensive strategy for responding to trafficking in and out of that country.

We see these as potential models of cooperation to be replicated as often as required. Our goal, ultimately, is to mobilize people everywhere so that trafficking in human beings is met by a stop sign visible around the equator and from pole to pole.

My friends, the invitation presented by the Hall of Fame is to "come stand among great women." In recent years, I have had that honor many times; not in fancy meeting rooms or the high councils of state, but in refugee camps; in villages constructed out of mud and tin; in urban health clinics, where malnutrition and disease conspire against life; in arid wastelands, where nothing grows but the appetites of small children. It is in these places that I have most often stood in the presence of great women—women who have been beaten back and beaten down and beaten up, but never defeated because their pride is too strong, their love too fierce, their spirit unshatterable.

The sentiments contained in the Seneca Falls Declaration have endured not simply because of their logic and eloquence but because of the underlying power of their central premise, which is that every individual counts. This basic idea of valuing each human person fairly is what has united the women's movement across the boundaries of nation, status, culture, through the window of time, back to

our great-grandmothers and forward to embrace the youngest girls here in this auditorium today.

This philosophy is not based on any illusions. Advocates of social progress have seen far too much of hardship and frustration to indulge in sentimentalism. But we live in a nation and a world that has been enriched beyond measure by those who have overcome enormous obstacles to build platforms of knowledge and accomplishment from which others might advance.

It is said that all work that is worth anything is done in faith. And so, on this day of warm memory and renewed resolve, let us all pledge to keep the faith that our perseverance and dedication will make a difference; that

every door opened by our striving, every life enriched by our giving, every soul inspired by our commitment, and every barrier to justice brought down by our determination will ennoble our own lives, inspire others, and explode outward the boundaries of what is achievable on this earth.

Let us go forward with respect and gratitude for those who came before us, with determination and love for our daughters and for the sons whose own lives will only be enriched by progress toward a world more equitable and democratic, more peaceful and fully free.

Thank you all very much for your attention and for this honor. ■

*Deputy Secretary Talbott*

## The U.S. and the Baltic Region

July 8, 1998

*Address to the U.S.-Baltic Partnership Commission,  
Riga, Latvia.*

President Ulmanis, Foreign Minister Saudargas, Foreign Minister Ilves, Foreign Minister Birkavs, ladies and gentlemen: It is a personal pleasure for me to be here today. It was 12 years ago that I first visited Riga. The year was 1986, and I was part of an American delegation attending a path-breaking, window-opening, indeed, door-opening conference held in Jurmala. My fellow visitors and I could sense the vitality, the strength, and the promise of the Baltic people. We also felt their longing for freedom.

I cannot, however, claim that any of us foresaw where those qualities would lead in a few short years: to independence, to democracy, to integration into a new Europe, and to a multidimensional partnership with the United States. The principal custodian of that partnership on the American side is President Bill Clinton. He has asked me to convey to you all an expression of his greetings—and a reiteration of his commitment. As he told your own presidents on January 16 in Washington, your American friends are committed to help you as you progress toward—and in due course through—the open doors of the Euro-Atlantic community's evolving and expanding institutions, very much including the new NATO.

It is in the national interest of the United States that you regain your rightful place in the European mainstream. The upheavals of the 20th century have taught us that when any part of Europe is isolated, repressed, unstable, or torn by violence, the peace of the entire Euro-Atlantic community is at risk. We learned that lesson the hard way in the 20th century; we must apply it in the right way in the 21st.

We are already doing so. Over the past 6 months, the commitments we have made to each other under the Baltic Charter have contributed to the prospects for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as individual, distinct European states and to the prospects for Europe as a whole.

In the realm of politics, we have worked together to consolidate your transition to democracy. The United States is supporting the

development of local non-governmental organizations through the new Baltic-American Partnership Fund, an initiative that my friend and colleague, the Deputy Administrator of our Agency for International Development, Harriet Babbitt, will be visiting each of your countries to discuss next week. We also are participating in the establishment of a graduate school of law here in Riga that will educate students from around the region.

In addition, we are helping you help yourselves in the field of social integration, particularly in support of legislation that meets the OSCE's recommendations on citizenship. Like the United States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are multi-ethnic societies. That fact presents both great opportunities and daunting challenges. The United States has learned from its own hard experience that if some members of the community are excluded from the benefits, opportunities, and responsibilities of citizenship, then the society and the nation as a whole suffer. In the Baltic Charter, all four of our nations have vowed to work toward inclusiveness and reconciliation as watchwords for the future. Each of your governments has taken important steps to translate those ideas into reality. As just one example, in May your presidents jointly launched national commissions to study the periods of the Holocaust and of totalitarian rule in each of your countries. We salute you for that.

Let me now turn to economics, another area in which we've made significant progress together. The bilateral working groups envisioned under the Baltic Charter have begun to identify key areas in which we can promote trade and investment. The American co-chair of that bilateral economic effort is my friend and colleague, Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat, who is heading this way later this week. He will be working with your colleagues on many of these same issues at the Council of Baltic Sea States Ministerial on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Vilnius on Friday, July 10.

Agriculture is a priority as well. The United States was pleased to join the Baltic states this morning in signing a memorandum of understanding that will expand our cooperation in that critical area.

In all of our economic efforts, we are putting a premium on partnership with the private sector. It is therefore fitting that more than 30 senior representatives of Baltic and American businesses are participating in this inaugural meeting of the Partnership Council. I look forward to discussing with them later today ways that we can work together to accelerate what has been called a Baltic revolution—a tide of economic reform and integration that has made this region one of Europe's most promising.

Finally, a word about security. As in the areas of democratization and economic reform, when you gained your independence 7 years ago you faced tremendous challenges in meeting your security needs. To help you surmount those challenges, our Department of Defense last year undertook a study of defense plans and programs, headed by one of our most capable senior officers, Maj. Gen. Buzz Kievenaar. I'm very pleased that Admiral Malone and Colonel Stolberg could represent General Kievenaar here today.

We are now working with your defense ministries to design long-term strategies to strengthen your self-defense capabilities and your ability to contribute to European security and stability. As part of that larger effort, we have developed a common position on the positive role that confidence-building measures can play in enhancing regional security, and we have initiated consultations on a range of arms

control issues as well. Those are just a few examples of the growing number of initiatives on which we are working together, not just in this region but across the continent.

Let me close with a brief word about one of the countries of the Baltic region that we hope will increasingly participate in various cooperative regional endeavors in all of the areas I've touched upon in my remarks—politics, economics, and security—and in others that also deserve mention, such as preserving the natural environment. That country is Russia, a nation with whom you share a complex and often painful history. If Russia can come to see the Baltic states not as a pathway inward for invading armies or as a buffer against imaginary enemies but as a gateway outward to the new Europe of which it seeks to be an increasingly active part, then everyone will benefit—your countries, mine, Russia itself, and the Euro-Atlantic community as a whole. We will all be safer and more secure.

Achieving that goal—like all the objectives I have touched on here today—will be far from quick or easy. But that said, the extraordinary record of your young democracies gives us, your American friends, reason for confidence and optimism. This past Saturday—July 4—we in the United States celebrated the 222d anniversary of our own independence. Your countries regained their independence only 7 years ago. That means we have a considerable headstart on you. That is grounds not for self-congratulation; rather, it is grounds for congratulating you. We are filled with admiration at how much you have accomplished in so short a time, and we are proud to be at your side in a great task of making sure that our common future vindicates the sacrifices—and avoids the mistakes—of the past.

Thank you very much. ■

*Robert S. Gelbard*

# U.S. Efforts To Promote a Peaceful Resolution to the Crisis in Kosovo

July 23, 1998

*Statement by the Special Representative of the President and the Secretary of State for Implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC.*

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hamilton, members of the committee: I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee and continue our dialogue on the ongoing crisis in Kosovo, which remains an important foreign policy priority for the Administration. We welcome your views on the situation in Kosovo. High-profile congressional interest in Kosovo helps us underscore to Belgrade and others the importance the United States attaches to this issue and reinforces our leverage with the parties in pursuit of a settlement.

The conflict in Kosovo has entered a new and potentially more dangerous phase given Belgrade's continued refusal to take the steps necessary to stabilize the situation and the resultant rapid growth in both size and capability of the armed Kosovo Albanian resistance. Louise Arbour, the lead prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia—ICTY—recently announced that the situation in Kosovo met the definition of "armed conflict" under relevant international law. This brings the conflict more clearly under the tribunal's jurisdiction. There is clearly an urgent need for both meaningful dialogue and immediate tension-reducing measures, including a comprehensive cessation of hostilities.

Although we are concerned about the actions of the Kosovo Liberation Army—commonly referred to by the Albanian acronym UCK—we must not lose sight of the fact that Belgrade initiated the confrontation in Kosovo, and President Milosevic and his government have primary responsibility for taking the steps necessary to bring an end to the violence. Belgrade's obligations to the international community have been clearly spelled out in the Contact Group statements of June 12 and July 8. These demands must be met for Belgrade to be able to normalize

relations with the outside world and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—F.R.Y.—to be welcome in the community of nations. Milosevic must:

- Pull back the security forces engaged in repressive actions in Kosovo;
- Initiate a meaningful dialogue with the Kosovar Albanian leadership aimed at producing a political settlement;
- Reach agreement with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Commission for the Red Cross on a program for the return of refugees and displaced persons;
- Ensure complete freedom of access for international personnel, including NGOs, journalists, and humanitarian aid workers; and
- Support the efforts of the international community to monitor events on the ground in Kosovo with complete and unfettered access.

Access in Kosovo for international personnel and NGOs has improved in the last month. However, Belgrade has done nothing to meet our other demands, particularly on security concerns and dialogue. In fact, President Milosevic has attempted to redefine his obligations by offering a number of more limited commitments to Russian President Yeltsin in Moscow on June 16. We have not, however, moderated our views in any way. Milosevic must meet all of his obligations to the Contact Group, or we will continue to look for ways to increase the pressure on Belgrade to move in a positive direction.

In truth, President Milosevic has failed to produce real progress even on the more limited commitments he made to President Yeltsin in Moscow. Our view on this is quite honestly different from that of the Russian Government. This is one reason why the latest Contact Group statement on Kosovo does not—in our opinion—go far enough in making clear to Belgrade exactly what is expected.

One area in which we are cooperating closely with the Russians as well as with a number of European governments is in putting a significant international presence on the ground in Kosovo. The establishment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission—KDOM—is a major diplomatic development that will significantly enhance our ability to gather real-time information about developments in Kosovo, as well as demonstrate international concern to all residents of Kosovo—Serbs as well as Kosovo Albanians. Already, 23 American personnel have been assigned to the U.S. embassy in the F.R.Y. to serve as observers and support staff for the KDOM, and 10 are already participating. Other countries, including members of EU, Russia, and Poland have or will soon assign personnel to this task. Despite continued promises of full cooperation, Belgrade authorities continue to erect roadblocks to the full deployment of the mission, most recently by refusing to grant flight clearance for four U.S. transport planes carrying needed vehicles, communications equipment, and medical supplies for the KDOM.

KDOM observers travel throughout Kosovo and speak to officials, combatants, and private citizens to ensure that we have a complete picture of what is happening in Kosovo. The mission also serves as a concrete international commitment to remain engaged in Kosovo until a political settlement is reached.

Accurate, up-to-date information is important, but that information must support a policymaking process that advances the cause of peace in Kosovo. Our own diplomatic efforts are continuing. Ambassador Chris Hill, who has been very active on this issue, has been shuttling back and forth between Belgrade and Pristina in an effort to revive negotiations. One aspect of Ambassador Hill's mission has been to work with the Kosovar Albanian side to promote the development of an authoritative negotiating team that represents the full spectrum of political opinion in the Kosovo Albanian community, including extremist elements. Unless the views of those on the Albanian side engaged in the fighting are represented, it is unlikely that either a cessation of hostilities or a comprehensive political settlement can be negotiated. That is why we have opened a dialogue with the UCK. The UCK is a reality on the ground, and however much we condemn the use of violence by either side, they will have to be a party to any cessation of hostilities.

Ambassador Hill has also met several times with President Milosevic, including this week, to press him to meet his obligations and take the steps necessary to revive the prospects for dialogue. The pressures on Milosevic are

mounting. The new sanctions—the most important of which is the investment ban agreed to by the Contact Group last month—have further undermined an already shaky Serbian economy. A recent assessment of the F.R.Y. economy prepared by the U.S. Treasury Department concluded that the economic and financial condition of the F.R.Y. had sunk to new lows, firmly establishing the country as the “sick man of Europe.”

In addition to the Contact Group, we are working in other multilateral fora to raise the stakes for Belgrade. In New York, we are consulting with friends and allies about possible action in the UN Security Council to reinforce the Contact Group demands. As part of our broader, regional strategy, we already have renewed the mandate for UN operations in Bosnia, on the Prevlaka Peninsula, and in Macedonia. In NATO councils, planning for possible NATO action is nearly completed.

While no decision has been made regarding the use of force, all options, including robust military intervention in Kosovo, remain on the table. NATO planning is on track, and Milosevic understands that this is no idle threat.

The deteriorating situation in Kosovo is a threat to regional peace and security. The potential for spillover into neighboring states remains a paramount concern, and we and our allies have made clear to President Milosevic that spillover of the conflict into Albania or Macedonia will not be tolerated. Albania is particularly vulnerable. Albanian authorities have little control over the northern third of their country, a situation that fuels—and is also fueled by—continuing instability in Kosovo. We are working with the Government of Albania to shore up security in the north, including through international training for Albanian police and a precedent-setting NATO cell in Tirana to coordinate cooperation through the Partnership for Peace. The recent and intense violence in the Orahovac region and reports of Serbian shells falling on Albanian territory underscore the urgency of the situation and the regional ramifications of continued conflict.

There are nearly 14,000 registered refugees in northern Albania who have fled the violence in Kosovo. More than 80,000 have been internally displaced in the F.R.Y., including almost 22,000 in Montenegro. The U.S. has

*“Unless the views of those on the Albanian side engaged in the fighting are represented, it is unlikely that either a cessation of hostilities or a comprehensive political settlement can be negotiated.”*

made available substantial assistance—currently \$8.5 million—to help international relief agencies cope with this crisis. The efforts include protection of refugees and displaced persons as well as contingency planning in Macedonia.

We need to protect our investment in Macedonian stability and promote the continued development of democratic institutions there. UNPREDEP continues to play an important role, and there is general agreement that the mandate should be extended. We have increased our bilateral assistance efforts in Macedonia from \$2 million last year to more than \$11 million this year and we have organized a NATO clearinghouse on Macedonian security to stimulate multilateral aid.

We are also concerned about the safety of the civilian population of Kosovo—ethnic Albanians, ethnic Serbs, and others. The United States and others in the international community have highlighted the abuses of the Serbian security forces in Kosovo and the use of indiscriminate and excessive force against Albanian noncombatants. We have also condemned attacks against Serb civilians by the UCK, including kidnaping. The Kosovo Observer Mission will continue to track these reports and provide timely information to the international community.

The Hague Tribunal has pledged to investigate reports of possible war crimes in Kosovo—by both sides. In one instance, three Serbian refugees who were on their way to Belgrade to apply for immigration to the United States through the International Organization for Migration were pulled off a bus by armed Albanians and held hostage. Two of those kidnaped have been released, but one—26-year-old, Djurdje Cuk—is still reported missing. Our disgust over the actions of the Serbian security forces in Kosovo does not mean that Albanian extremists should be given a free hand. Further violence, no matter who is responsible, will only make it more difficult to achieve a negotiated political settlement. We have made this clear to UCK leaders in our discussions to date and will continue to emphasize the importance of restraint in any future meetings.

Reports that Serbian police are responsible for the disappearance of a large number of Kosovar Albanians are extremely troubling. We have put considerable emphasis on the need for Belgrade authorities to accept independent forensics investigators to look into allegations of summary executions in the Drenica region of Kosovo. We expect that the ICTY as well as our allies will make this a priority issue.

Belgrade's imposition of a food blockade on Kosovo further exacerbates an already perilous situation for the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo. We have seen credible reports that Belgrade has instructed food suppliers to deliver only to state-run stores in Kosovo, which are all controlled by Serbs. We have seen this kind of intimidation tactic before and condemn such actions as violation of human rights and a cynical manipulation of Kosovo's most vulnerable.

We continue to believe that a solution for the problems of Kosovo can and must be found within existing international borders. The entire international community recognizes that only meaningful self-government for Kosovo can address the legitimate grievances of the Kosovo Albanian community and promote stability in that volatile region. The UCK will not be able to shoot its way out of the F.R.Y., but neither can Belgrade maintain its authority in Kosovo with a nightstick clutched in an iron hand. There is no battlefield solution for either side. Only open dialogue and sincere negotiations can resolve the current impasse.

There is no quick fix for Kosovo. This is a difficult and complex problem bred by years of Belgrade's intransigence and lack of democratic institutions. U.S. leadership will remain essential to move this issue forward.

The United States has made a significant investment in Balkan stability. Continuing unrest and violence in Kosovo threaten that investment. We must act early, and we must act decisively to put an end to the conflict in Kosovo, beginning with an agreement on a cessation of hostilities.

A truly stable and lasting solution to the problems of Kosovo will require the development of strong democratic institutions in Serbia and the F.R.Y. A new generation of political leaders—with a greater understanding and respect for the traditions of European democracy—must emerge and take charge of their own destiny. In Montenegro, President Milo Djukanovic has already begun this process. His reformist policies—and those of his new government—have our full support. Serbia is lagging behind, but even in Serbia there are some promising young political figures, and we are doing everything we can to promote their development as genuine leaders.

I would like to thank you once again, Mr. Chairman, for your committee's attention to this issue. We want to continue to work closely with you and with other members of the committee to promote a peaceful resolution to the problems of Kosovo. Thank you. ■

David J. Scheffer

# Developments at the Rome Treaty Conference

July 23, 1998

*Statement by the Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues and Head of the U.S. Delegation to the UN Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC.*

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address the committee on the developments in Rome this summer relating to the establishment of a permanent international criminal court. As you know, I had the pleasure of being joined by a number of committee staffers during the Rome conference, and I am sure they brought back to you their own perspectives on the negotiations.

Mr. Chairman, no one can survey events of this decade without profound concern about worldwide respect for internationally recognized human rights. We live in a world where entire populations can still be terrorized and slaughtered by nationalistic butchers and undisciplined armies. We have witnessed this in Iraq, in the Balkans, and in central Africa. Internal conflicts dominate the landscape of armed struggle today, and impunity too often shields the perpetrators of the most heinous crimes against their own people and others. As the most powerful nation committed to the rule of law, we have a responsibility to confront these assaults on humankind. One response mechanism is accountability; namely, to help bring the perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes to justice. If we allow them to act with impunity, then we will only be inviting a perpetuation of these crimes far into the next millennium. Our legacy must demonstrate an unyielding commitment to the pursuit of justice.

That is why, since early 1995, U.S. negotiators labored through many Ad Hoc and Preparatory Committee sessions at the United Nations in an effort to craft an acceptable statute for a permanent international criminal court using as a foundation the draft statute prepared by the International Law Commission in 1994. Our experience with the establishment and operation of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and

Rwanda had convinced us of the merit of creating a permanent court that could be more quickly available for investigations and prosecutions and more cost-efficient in its operation.

But we always knew how complex the exercise was, the risks that would have to be overcome, and the patience that we and others would have to demonstrate to get the document right. We were, after all, confronted with the task of fusing the diverse criminal law systems of nations and the laws of war into one functioning courtroom in which we and others had confidence criminal justice would be rendered fairly and effectively. We also were drafting a treaty-based court in which sovereign governments would agree to be bound by its jurisdiction in accordance with the terms of its statute. How so many governments would agree with precision on the content of those provisions would prove to be a daunting challenge. When some other governments wanted to rush to conclude this monumental task—even as early as the end of 1995—the United States pressed successfully for a more methodical and considered procedure for the drafting and examination of texts.

The U.S. delegation arrived in Rome on June 13 with critical objectives to accomplish in the final text of the statute. Our delegation included highly talented and experienced lawyers and other officials from the Departments of State and Justice, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and from the private sector. America can be proud of the tireless work and major contributions that these individuals made to the negotiations.

Among the objectives we achieved in the statute of the court were the following:

- An improved regime of complementarity—meaning deferral to national jurisdictions—that provides significant protection, although not as much as we had sought;

- A role preserved for the UN Security Council, including the affirmation of the Security Council's power to intervene to halt the court's work;
- Sovereign protection of national security information that might be sought by the court;
- Broad recognition of national judicial procedures as a predicate for cooperation with the court;
- Coverage of internal conflicts, which comprise the vast majority of armed conflicts today;
- Important due process protections for defendants and suspects;
- Viable definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the incorporation in the statute of elements of offenses. We are not entirely satisfied with how the elements have been incorporated in the treaty, but, at least, they will be a required part of the court's work. We also were not willing to accept the wording proposed for a war crime covering the transfer of population into occupied territory;
- Recognition of gender issues;
- Acceptable provisions based on command responsibility and superior orders;
- Rigorous qualifications for judges;
- Acceptance of the basic principle of state party funding;
- An Assembly of states parties to oversee the management of the court;
- Reasonable amendment procedures;
- A sufficient number of ratifying states before the treaty can enter into force; namely, 60 governments have to ratify the treaty.

The U.S. delegation also sought to achieve other objectives in Rome that in our view are critical. I regret to report that certain of these objectives were not achieved, and, therefore, we could not support the draft that emerged on July 17.

First, while we successfully defeated initiatives to empower the court with universal jurisdiction, a form of jurisdiction over non-party states was adopted by the conference despite our strenuous objections. In particular, the treaty specifies that, as a precondition to the jurisdiction of the court over a crime, either the state of territory where the crime was committed or the state of nationality of the perpetrator of the crime must be a party to the treaty or have granted its voluntary consent to the jurisdiction of the court. We sought an amendment to the text that would have required both of these countries to be party to the treaty or, at a minimum, would have required that only the consent of the state of nationality of the perpetrator be obtained before the court could exercise jurisdiction. We asked for a vote on our proposal,

but a motion to take no action was overwhelmingly carried by the vote of participating governments in the conference.

We are left with consequences that do not serve the cause of international justice. Since most atrocities are committed internally and most internal conflicts are between warring parties of the same nationality, the worst offenders of international humanitarian law can choose never to join the treaty and be fully insulated from its reach absent a Security Council referral. Yet multinational peacekeeping forces operating in a country that has joined the treaty can be exposed to the court's jurisdiction even if the country of the individual peacekeeper has not joined the treaty. Thus, the treaty purports to establish an arrangement whereby U.S. Armed Forces operating overseas could be conceivably prosecuted by the international court even if the United States has not agreed to be bound by the treaty. Not only is this contrary to the most fundamental principles of treaty law, it could inhibit the ability of the United States to use its military to meet alliance obligations and participate in multinational operations, including humanitarian interventions to save civilian lives. Other contributors to peacekeeping operations will be similarly exposed.

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. delegation certainly reduced exposure to unwarranted prosecutions by the international court through our successful efforts to build into the treaty a range of safeguards that will benefit not only us but also our friends and allies. But serious risks remain because of the document's provisions on jurisdiction.

Our position is clear: Official actions of a non-party state should not be subject to the court's jurisdiction if that country does not join the treaty, except by means of Security Council action under the UN Charter. Otherwise, the ratification procedure would be meaningless for governments. In fact, under such a theory, two governments could join together to create a criminal court and purport to extend its jurisdiction over everyone, everywhere in the world. There will necessarily be cases where the international court cannot and should not have jurisdiction unless the Security Council decides otherwise. The United States has long supported the right of the Security Council to refer situations to the court with mandatory effect, meaning that any rogue state could not deny the court's jurisdiction under any circumstances. We believe this is the only way, under international law and the UN Charter, to impose the court's jurisdiction on a non-party state. In fact, the treaty reaffirms this Security Council referral power. Again, the governments

that collectively adopt this treaty accept that this power would be available to assert jurisdiction over rogue states.

Second, as a matter of policy, the United States took the position in these negotiations that states should have the opportunity to assess the effectiveness and impartiality of the court before considering whether to accept its jurisdiction. At the same time, we recognized the ideal of broad ICC jurisdiction. Thus, we were prepared to accept a treaty regime in which any state party would need to accept the automatic jurisdiction of the court over the crime of genocide, as had been recommended by the International Law Commission in 1994. We sought to facilitate U.S. participation in the treaty by proposing a 10-year transitional period following entry into force of the treaty and during which any state party could “opt-out” of the court’s jurisdiction over crimes against humanity or war crimes. We were prepared to accept an arrangement whereby at the end of the 10-year period, there would be three options—to accept the automatic jurisdiction of the court over all of the core crimes, to cease to be a party, or to seek an amendment to the treaty extending its “opt-out” protection.

We believe such a transition period is important for our government to evaluate the performance of the court and to attract a broad range of governments to join the treaty in its early years. While we achieved the agreement of the Permanent Members of the Security Council for this arrangement as well as appropriate protection for non-party states, other governments were not prepared to accept our proposal. In the end, an opt-out provision of 7 years for war crimes only was adopted.

Unfortunately, because of the extraordinary way the court’s jurisdiction was framed at the last moment, a country willing to commit war crimes could join the treaty and “opt-out” of war crimes jurisdiction for 7 years, while a non-party state could deploy its soldiers abroad and be vulnerable to assertions of jurisdiction.

Further, under the amendment procedures, states parties to the treaty can avoid jurisdiction over acts committed by their nationals or on their territory for any new or amended crimes. This is protection we successfully sought. But as the jurisdiction provision is now framed, it purports to extend jurisdiction over non-party states for the same new or amended crimes.

The treaty also creates a *proprio motu*—or self-initiating prosecutor—who, on his or her own authority with the consent of two judges, can initiate investigations and prosecutions without referral to the court of a situation either by a government that is party to the treaty or by the Security Council. We opposed this proposal, as we are concerned that it will

encourage overwhelming the court with complaints and risk diversion of its resources, as well as embroil the court in controversy, political decisionmaking, and confusion.

In addition, we are disappointed with the treatment of the crime of aggression. We and others had long argued that such a crime had not been defined under customary international law for purposes of individual criminal responsibility. We also insisted, as did the International Law Commission in 1994, that there had to be a direct linkage between a prior Security Council decision that a state had committed aggression and the conduct of an individual of that state. The statute of the court now includes a crime of aggression but leaves it to be defined by a subsequent amendment to be adopted 7 years after entry into force. There is no guarantee that the vital linkage with a prior decision by the Security Council will be required by the definition that emerges if, in fact, a broadly acceptable definition can be achieved. We will do all we can to ensure that such linkage survives.

We also joined with many other countries during the years of negotiation to oppose the inclusion of crimes of terrorism and drug crimes in the jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that this could undermine more effective national efforts. We had largely prevailed with this point of view only to discover on the last day of the conference that the Bureau’s final text suddenly stipulated, in an annexed resolution that would be adopted by the conference, that crimes of terrorism and drug crimes should be included within the jurisdiction of the court, subject only to the question of defining the relevant crimes at a review conference in the future. This last-minute insertion in the text greatly concerned us, and we opposed the resolution with a public explanation. We said that while we had an open mind about future consideration of crimes of terrorism and drug crimes, we did not believe that including them will assist in the fight against these two evil crimes. To the contrary, conferring jurisdiction on the court could undermine essential national and

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transnational efforts, and actually hamper the effective fight against these crimes. The problem, we said, was not prosecution, but rather investigation. These crimes require an ongoing law enforcement effort against criminal organizations and patterns of crime, with police and intelligence resources. The court will not be equipped effectively to investigate and prosecute these types of crimes.

Finally, we were confronted on July 17 with a provision stipulating that no reservations to the treaty would be allowed. We had long argued against such a prohibition and many countries had joined us in that concern. We believed that at a minimum there were certain provisions of the treaty, particularly in the field of state cooperation with the court, where domestic constitutional requirements and national judicial procedures might require a reasonable opportunity for reservations that did not defeat the intent or purpose of the treaty.

Mr. Chairman, the Administration hopes that in the years ahead other governments will recognize the benefits of potential American participation in the Rome treaty and correct the flawed provisions in the treaty.

In the meantime, the challenge of international justice remains. The United States will continue as a leader in supporting the common duty of all law-abiding governments to bring to justice those who commit heinous crimes in our own time and in the future. The hard reality is that the international court will have no jurisdiction over crimes committed prior to its actual operation. So more ad hoc judicial mechanisms will need to be considered. We trust our friends and allies will show as much resolve to pursue the challenges of today as they have to create the future international court. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ■



# TREATY ACTIONS

## MULTILATERAL

### Judicial Procedure

Convention abolishing the requirement of legalization for foreign public documents; with annex. Done at The Hague Oct. 5, 1961. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1965; for the United States Oct. 15, 1981. 33 UST 883; TIAS 10072.

*Accessions:* Czech Republic, June 23, 1998; Niue, June 10, 1998; Venezuela, July 1, 1998.

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters. Opened for signature at The Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 7, 1971. 23 UST 2555; TIAS 7444.

*Accessions:* China, Dec. 8, 1997<sup>1, 2</sup>; South Africa, July 8, 1997.<sup>1, 2</sup>

### Pollution

Adjustments to the Montreal protocol of Sept. 16, 1987 on substances that deplete the ozone layer. Adopted at Montreal Sept. 15-17, 1997. Entered into force June 5, 1998.

### Postal

Postal parcels agreement with final protocol. Done at Seoul Sept. 14, 1994. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1996. Entered into force for the U.S. May 20, 1998.

Money orders agreement. Done at Seoul Sept. 14, 1994. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1996. Entered into force for the U.S. May 20, 1998.

## BILATERAL

### Argentina

Agreement concerning the provision of satellite facilities and the transmission and reception of signals to and from satellites for the provision of satellite services to users in the United States of America and the Argentine Republic, with protocol. Signed at Washington June 5, 1998. Entered into force June 5, 1998.

### Bulgaria

Basic exchange and cooperative agreement for topographic mapping, nautical, and aeronautical charting, safety to flight and sea navigation information, geodesy and gravimetrics, digital data, and related global geospatial information and services, with annexes. Signed at Washington May 13, 1998. Entered into force May 13, 1998.

### Cote d'Ivoire

Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Washington July 13, 1998. Enters into force on date on which Cote d'Ivoire notifies the U.S. that all legal requirements have been fulfilled.

Agreement regarding the consolidation, reduction, and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington July 29, 1998. Enters into force upon receipt by Cote d'Ivoire of written notice from the U.S. that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.

### Czech Republic

Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Prague June 11, 1998. Enters into force upon exchange of diplomatic notes confirming that parties have completed their respective internal requirements necessary for entry into force.

### Ethiopia

Agreement on civil aviation safety and security. Effected by exchange of notes at Addis Ababa May 29 and June 2, 1998. Entered into force June 2, 1998.

### European Communities

Agreement on the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws. Signed at Brussels and Washington June 3 and 4, 1998. Entered into force June 4, 1998.

### Guinea

Agreement for cooperation in the Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) Program, with appendices. Signed at Conakry May 14, 1998. Entered into force May 14, 1998.

### Haiti

Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Port-au-Prince June 29, 1998. Entered into force June 29, 1998.

### Ireland

Agreement regarding mutual assistance between their customs administrations. Signed at Dublin Sept. 16, 1996. Entered into force May 21, 1998.

### **Japan**

Agreement concerning a program for the cooperative research of advanced hybrid propulsion technologies. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo May 26, 1998. Entered into force May 26, 1998.

Agreement concerning a cash contribution by Japan for administrative and related expenses arising from implementation of the mutual defense agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo May 29, 1998. Entered into force May 29, 1998.

### **Mexico**

Minute No. 298 of the International Boundary and Water Commission concerning recommendations for construction of works parallel to the city of Tijuana, B.C. wastewater pumping and disposal system and rehabilitation of the San Antonio de los Buenos treatment plant. Signed at El Paso Dec. 2, 1997. Entered into force Jan. 23, 1998.

### **Mozambique**

Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 29 and July 14, 1998. Entered into force July 14, 1998.

### **Netherlands**

Memorandum of understanding concerning technology research and development projects, with annex. Signed at Washington May 14, 1998. Entered into force May 14, 1998.

### **Philippines**

Agreement amending the strategic objective grant agreement for the integrated family planning maternal health program, as amended. Signed at Manila June 11, 1998. Entered into force June 11, 1998.

Agreement amending the strategic objective grant agreement for the AIDS surveillance and education program, as amended. Signed at Manila June 11, 1998. Entered into force June 11, 1998.

### **Romania**

Agreement on cooperation in science and technology, with annexes. Signed at Washington July 15, 1998. Enters into force upon exchange of diplomatic notes confirming parties have completed their respective internal requirements.

### **Russia**

Agreement amending the agreement of May 25, 1972 on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas. Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow Oct. 12, 1997 and May 28, 1998. Entered into force May 28, 1998.

### **Senegal**

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 28, 1995, regarding the consolidation, reduction, and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies. Effected by exchange of notes at Dakar Nov. 17, 1997 and May 28, 1998. Entered into force May 28, 1998.

### **South Africa**

Memorandum of cooperation concerning mutual cooperation in the area of air navigation and air traffic control. Signed at Washington and Pretoria May 15 and 20, 1998. Entered into force May 20, 1998.

### **United Nations**

Agreement extending the agreement of Mar. 14, 1994, as extended, concerning the provision of assistance on a reimbursable basis in support of the operations of the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia. Signed at New York Apr. 9 and 20, and May 22, 1998. Entered into force May 22, 1998; effective Mar. 14, 1998.

Agreement amending the cooperation service agreement of Oct. 18, 1994, as extended, for the contribution of personnel to the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Effected by exchange of letters at New York May 19 and 22, 1998. Entered into force May 22, 1998.

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<sup>1</sup> With declaration(s).

<sup>2</sup> With reservation(s). ■